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In the 
Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD 
COMPANY, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
-vs.-
EL PASO NATURAL GAS 
COMPANY, 
Defendant-Respondent. 
Case No. 10361 
APPELLANT'S PE'TI'TION FOR REHEARING 
AND BRIEF IN SUPPORT THEREOF 
PETI1TION FOR REHEARING 
COMES NOW Union Pacific Railroad Company, 
plaintiff and appellant herein, and petitions the above 
entitled court for a rehearing of the above entitled case 
heretofore decided by opinion of this court made and 
entered December 15, 1965. 'This petition is based upon 
the following grounds : 
1. This court erroneously held that the connection 
or relationship between the existence and maintenance 
of the pipeline, on the one hand, and Stacey's accident, 
on the other hand, was merely a "remote" or "coincident-
al" one; and erroneously held that there was no substan-
tial causational relationship between the pipeline and 
the accident. 
2 
2. This court erred in that it apparently overlooked 
the most significant factual matters established in this 
lawsuit bearing upon the nature of the relationship be-
tween the existence and maintenance of the pipeline, on 
the one hand, and Stacey's accident, on the other hand. 
3. This court erroneously held that the language 
of indemnity involved in this case did not sufficiently 
express a clear and unequivocal intent of the parties 
to provide indemnity in favor of the appellant from re-
spondent for losses due in part to appellant's negligence. 
4. This court erred in that it overlooked the appli-
cable law of the State of vVyoming governing proper 
disposition of the issue mentioned in Point 3 above. 
5. This court erred in that it placed reliance on 
older decisions from courts of other jurisdictions which 
are not currently acceptable even to the courts which 
originally wrote or made such decisions. 
Respectfully submitted, 
BRYAN P. LEVERICH 
A. U. MINER 
HOWARD F. CORAY 
SCOTT M. MATHESON 
NORMAN vV. KETTNER 
Counsel for Plaintiff-Appellant 
Address : 10 South Main St. 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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APPELLANT'S BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF 
ITS PETITION FOR REHEARING 
PRELDHNARY STATEMENT 
The facts of this case having been stated in appel-
lant's original brief, restated in respondent's brief, and 
in most respects again stated in the court's opinion en-
tered December 15, 1965, there is no need to set them 
forth here. However, mention should now be made of two 
particularly significant facts relied upon by appellant in 
support of its petition for rehearing for the reason that 
the majority opinion of this court makes no reference to 
them whatever; and this strongly suggests the same were 
overlooked by this court. Those facts are that the private 
crossing on which Stacey was injured provided the only 
reasonably practical route by which Stacey or other em-
ployes of respondent could reach those certain portions 
of the easement areas conveyed by the deed to which 
Stacey was enroute when injured; and the ingress and 
egress language of the deed shows conclusively the par-
ties thereto did have that general subject in mind when 
the deed was delivered and accepted. 
ARGUMENT POINT I 
Appellant's Points 1 and 2 of its petition for re-
hearing are so closely related that appellant's argument 
in support thereof may be most briefly made by treating 
them as a single unit. This court held that the relation-
ship which existed between the existence and maintenance 
of the pipeline and Stacey's accident was "remote" and 
"coincidental"; and that there \Yas no substantial causa-
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tional relationship between these matters. This holding 
overlooks: (a) that the crossing on which Stacey was in-
jured afforded the only possible route which he could use 
to reach the easement areas conveyed by the deed on 
which a portion of the pipeline was located; (b) that the 
parties had ingress and egress to and from the easement 
areas in mind as shown by a provision to that effect in 
the deed; so that ( c) the parties to this deed must neces-
sarily have intended, and the actual conduct of those 
parties shows conclusively they intended, that use of the 
crossing by respondent's employes in maintaining the 
pipeline was neither "remote" from nor simply "coinci-
dental" with the existence and maintenance of the pipe-
line. 
In its opinion this court agreed with appellant's pre-
viously espoused contention that the indemnity language 
of the deed encompassed indemnity for losses due to some 
type of causal relationship between the pipline and 
Stacey's accident other than one of "proximate" or 
"legal" cause; and also agreed that "but for" the pipe-
line, Stacey's accident with its consequent loss to Union 
Pacific would never have occurred. However, this court 
has refused to agree with appellant's further contention 
that the language of the indemnity provision encompassed 
losses, among others, with the very type of causal rela-
tionship which existed here. The court based its refusal 
on its characterization of the relationship (some relation-
ship being conceded) as "remote" and as "coincidental." 
We acknowledge that it is difficult for this court, 
or any other, to describe the nature of a relationship be-
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tween the two factors (the pipeline and the accident) in 
a word or two and still express adequately the whole 
process of the court's reasoning. And we do not quarrel 
with the two words selected by the court in its effort 
to describe its conclusion simply because the words chosen 
are possibly a shorthand way of expressing the court's 
total thought concept. But we do respectfully assert that 
words such as "remote" and "coincidental" are mere ad-
jectives ; that their use obscures rather than clarifies 
the real problem in this lawsuit; and that their use seems 
to indicate this court, albeit unintentionally, judged the 
nature of the relationship between the existence of the 
pipeline and Stacey's accident in terms commonly used 
in considering, and significant only with respect to, cases 
involving the doctrine of "proximate cause." For what is 
there about such words from the indemnity language in 
the deed as : "in any other way whatsoever is due to or 
arises because of the existence of the pipeline," which 
suggests that some "remote" relationship does not satisfy 
their meaning? Even if event "B" is only "remotely" due 
to phenomenon "A", can it be said "B" is not due to "A" 
at all? And if "B" is due to "A" at all, is it not due to 
"A": "in any way whatsoever"? If the "remote" test is 
to be used despite the lack of any aid therefrom in deci-
sion of this lawsuit, then by what measure was or is it 
to be decided the relationship between the pipeline 
and Stacey's accident was "remote" or "coincidental" T 
Is it to be decided solely by a measure of geographical 
distance 1 Surely not, for if so this case is one for deci-
sion by a surveyor, not a court. If not by measure of 
distance, then by application of what legal theory is that 
conclusion reached or reachable? Is it by some sort of 
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judicial instinct¥ Certainly that conclusion is not sup-
portable by resort to the analogies used for illustrative 
purposes by this court in its opinion, as will hereinafter 
be pointed out. 
Parenthetically we ask the court to note here this 
appellant has never contended that absolutely every 
cause in fact or "but for" relationship between the pipe-
line and an accident was sufficient to invoke the indem-
nity language of the deed. Please see the paragraph of 
appellant's original brief beginning at the bottom of page 
18 and ending on page 19. Instead, appellant suggested 
at page 21 of that brief what we still think is the only 
rational measure or yardstick by which valid conclusions 
can be reached concerning the nature of that connection 
or relationships, as distinguished from reaching those 
conclusions through use of mere semantics. That sug-
gested test, one of determining which hazards were con-
templated by the parties when the deed was given, also 
illustrates the precise reasons why the analogies sug-
gested by the court are, in our opinion, inappropriate. 
We could easily agree with the majority opinion 
of this court that those who negotiated the terms of 
the deed involved here were not thinking of, nor are they 
to be held to have been considering, risks or hazards of 
loss arising in circumstances where El Paso's employes 
were hurt or injured hundreds or thousands of miles from 
the easement areas while engaged coincidentally (if that 
is to be the magic word) in some activity related to the 
pipeline. But that situation is not analogous to the case 
this court was and is called upon to consider. Here 
Stacey was, at the very moment of his accident, on appel-
lant's railroad property; using a private, not a public, 
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crossing; and, most importantly, using the only practical 
route which existed to reach some of the easement areas 
conveyed by the deed. Surely there is some very real 
difference between that situation and the examples con-
ceived and mentioned by this court. The difference lies in 
the fact that ordinary business men would not normally 
be considered to have contracted with hazards of acci-
dents occurring hundreds or thousands of miles away in 
their minds; but the same ordinary business men should 
very well normally be considered to have contracted with 
those hazards immediately at hand on this crossing very 
much in mind. Especially so since there was no other 
practical route to the pipeline in that area. The question 
therefore becomes : Is that difference sufficient to war-
rant a different answer than this court has given~ Solu-
tion of that question should depend, with all due and 
genuine deference to this court's views and opinion, not 
upon use of adjectives germane only to a "proximate 
cause" case; but instead upon consideration of the intent 
of these parties; that is whether or not the parties' words 
and conduct were such as to justify the court in deciding 
hazards at this particular crossing should be held to be 
within the contemplation of the parties. 
\Ve believe the "hazards which should be held to have 
been contemplated by the parties" test, heretofore sug-
gested at page 21 of our original brief and repeated here, 
is the only measure of the relationship between the pipe-
line and the accident which is meaningful in this case. 
But whether it is or not, and we ask the court to note the 
total absence of any suggestion whatever made by re-
spondent either in its brief or at oral argument as to 
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what is a better test, we respectfully urge that decision 
of this case simply by use of an indeterminate adjective 
such as "remote" leaves entirely unknowable and unas-
certainable by what standard the court's decision was 
reached. 
We also respectfully urge it appears this court did 
not give adequate consideration and effect to the fact 
that the crossing involved furnished the only route to 
the pipeline easement areas. At least that fact, estab-
lished by the record at pages 47 and 164, is neither men-
tioned in the majority opinion of the court nor described 
in that opinion as immaterial. Granting that this court 
can never satisfy the desires of counsel as to the content 
(let alone the result) of its opinions, does not a case of 
this magnitude justify full analysis of a factor such as 
this one which obviously has at least some bearing on 
proper disposition of the lawsuit 1 
This petition and brief is not filed merely to criticize 
or belittle the literary qualities of the court's opinion. 
It is, instead, intended to present appellant's vital conten-
tion that the fact this crossing was the only way for 
Stacey to get to the pipeline, and the effect of that fact 
upon (a) the analogies relied upon by the court, and (b) 
upon the court's final conclusions, does merit further con-
sideration by this court in this lawsuit. For reasons 
pointed out in our original brief, this fact in and of itself 
shows the parties to this suit should be held by this court 
to have contemplated that the hazard of loss arising from 
use of the crossing was closely, not "remotely", connected 
with and related to the existence of the pipeline and its 
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maintenance. Moreover, the basis for our assertion lies 
not alone in the difference between one and one-half miles 
and the several hundred miles examples of the court. It 
lies in the very realistic difference between contracting 
for indemnity as to the hazard of an easily foreseeable 
crossing accident at this crossing which was, for practical 
purposes, inseparably related to the pipeline - as distin-
guished from contracting for indemnity as to the hazards 
of some accident whose relationship to the pipeline was 
so tenuous, and whose forseeability was so difficult, that 
ordinary people would not consider it as an added hazard 
created by the pipeline at all. In short, there is no logical 
legal reason (nor for that matter even a geographical 
basis) for a conclusion that because an accident in 
Chicago or Salt Lake is "remote", so also is one occur-
ring on the crossing where Stacey was hurt in the cir-
cumstances here. 
ARGUMENT POINT II 
Appellant's Points 3 and 4 set forth in its Petition 
for Rehearing also lend themselves to discussion simul-
taneously. Both these points concern the court's holding 
that the indemnity language of the deed here involved 
did not sufficiently express a clear and unequivocal inten-
tion to provide indemnity to the appellant at the hands of 
respondent for losses due to appellant's negligence. At 
the outset of the discussion of this point, we are impelled 
to say this court has apparently misconceived the nature 
of appellant's position on an important phase of this 
problem. ·That phase is the matter of whether or not 
there were discussions or negotiations between appellant 
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and respondent prior to execution and delivery of the 
deed with regard to indemnity in favor of appellant 
for losses occasioned by "negligence" of the appellant. 
This court said in the third full paragraph on page 3 
of its opinion as follows: 
"This is pointed up by the plaintiff's own 
argument. It asserts that the parties in fact dis-
cussed the possibility of loss arising from its negli-
gence, and that the agreement was intended to 
cover such an eventuality. Assuming it to be true 
that they discussed the matter, this does not 
strengthen the plaintiff's position, nor does it im-
pair the validity of the trial court's conclusion. If 
the matter was discussed and was thus in the 
minds of the parties, this would affirm with great-
er emphasis that the Union Pacific should have 
expressly so stated in the contract. " (italics 
added) 
The court's statement quoted above seems to us to be 
premised on the assumption that appellant's position 
throughout the course of this litigation has been to the 
effect both appellant and respondent talked about in-
demnity for losses arising from Union Pacific's negli-
gence entirely separately and as a different and distinct 
subject for discussion than indemnity to Union Pacific 
in any and all circumstances where the loss to Union Pa-
cific resulted in any way whatsoever from the existence 
or maintenance of the pipeline. Such has never been 
Union Pacific's position in this case. To the contrary of 
the court's assumption, appellant has contended that 
the negotiations or discussions between the parties hereto 
prior to the execution and delivery of the deed occurred 
in only two ways: (a) By means of the general oral dis-
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cussions evidenced by plaintiffs response to defendant's 
request for admission No. 9; and { b) By means of the 
submission to respondent of the precise form of indem-
nity language to be used in the deed, with the corres-
pondence pertaining thereto. (R. 49, 50, 51, 56, 57, 58 and 
164). And the important and significant fact with regard 
to these negotiations or discussions is this: It was the 
purpose of both Union Pacific and El Paso to provide 
for indemnity to Union Pacific from El Paso as to losses 
arising from the existence or maintenance of the pipe-
line, or other activities of El Paso in connection there-
with specified in the deed, without distinction whatsoever 
as to other contributing factors to such losses, including 
negligence of the Railroad Company, so long as those 
losses were in any way whatsoever due to the existence 
of the pipeline. What else does the phrase "howsoever 
caused" used in the deed really mean? .Never has appellant 
contended that there were discussions between the parties 
in which the specific words "negligence of Union Pacific" 
were used. Appellant's position is and always has been 
that the negotiations and discussions consisted, in sub-
stance, of appellant's advice to respondent to the effect 
that Union Pacific expected to be as thoroughly free 
from risk of loss after the pipeline was constructed as 
it was before the same existed; and the submission to 
respondent by appellant of the precise language of indem-
nity eventually to be used in the deed, which language was 
literally sufficient to accomplish that purpose absolutely. 
The very absence of negotiation or discussion in which 
the specific term "negligence" was used seems to us the 
most persuasive possible reason supporting appellant's 
argument that the language used in the deed was intend-
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ed to cover all losses-not merely those losses occasioned 
Union Pacific independently of its own negligence. Both 
these parties knew how to say there would be no indem-
nity for losses due to Union Pacific negligence had they 
desired to so agree. The negotiations, as outlined above, 
reveal absolutely no purpose whatever on the part of 
those who conducted them to draw some distinction based 
on any determination (subsequently perhaps to be made 
by some unknown court or unknown jury) that any given 
loss was due to negligence of the Railroad Company. Nor 
does the language used in the deed evidence any such 
purpose. The purpose was and remains to provide for 
indemnity in favor of Union Pacific whenever a given 
loss was in "any way whatsoever due to" the existence 
or maintenance of the pipeline. The fact that such 
losses might also be due in part to negligence of the ap-
pellant was so wholly irrelevant to the arrangement these 
parties were consumating that it neither merited nor 
received special mention containing the word "negli-
gence." Accordingly, this court's seeming reliance on 
the notion that there were specific discussions of some 
sort of distinction drawn by the parties as between those 
losses occasioned, in part, by railroad negligence and 
other types of losses, yet without expression of that dis-
tinction in the deed, is unfounded in fact and unsupported 
by the record before this court. ·This was never a case 
in which appellant and respondent divided the losses 
which might occur due to the existence of the pipeline into 
two separate parts: (a) those due to railroad negligence 
and (b) those occurring without railroad negligence; and 
then ( c) described those two factors separately in the 
deed. It was instead a case in which the parties dealt with 
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the sum of (a) and ( b) above in one fell swoop rather 
than in pieces. And treatment of all such losses as a 
whole, rather than breaking the whole in pieces, evidences 
no intent to leave out one of the pieces. Nor does the 
decision of this court in Barrus v. Wilkinson, 16 U. (2d) 
204, 398 P.(2d) 207, relied upon by the court in its foot-
note No. 4, decide otherwise. One who reads that case 
carefully will search in vain for even a hint that parties 
may not contract for indemnity as to losses occasioned 
by the indemnitee's own negligence without stating that 
proposition separately from indemnity for other losses. 
We do not intend to repeat all the argument made 
rn our original brief. But it should be added here the 
only case from Wyoming discovered by either party to 
this lawsuit dealing with the question of whether or not 
indemnity language is sufficient to cover losses oc-
casioned by the indemnitee's own negligence without 
specific mention of that word or its equivalent in the 
indemnity provision is the case of C. & N.W. Railway 
Company vs. Rissler, 184 F.Supp. 98. The deed involved 
in this lawsuit conveyed an interest in real estate in 
Wyoming. Its acceptance by respondent was evidenced 
and completed solely by recordation by respondent of 
that deed in a County Recorder's office in Wyoming 
and use of the easement areas in Wyoming. That ac-
ceptance, in Wyo ming, first bound respondent to any 
contractual indemnity liability. Stacey's accident oc-
curred im Wyoming. Can there be any dispute that the 
law of Wyoming governs interpretation of the meaning 
and effect of the indemnity provision under these cir-
cumstances despite that fact Stacey's suit was brought 
14 
in Utah and the current suit was brought in Utah state 
courts~ Restatement of Conflict of La\vs, Sec. 214:, Sec. 
311, Sec. 312, Sec. 323, Sec. 325, Sec. 332 (f), and Sec. 
346; Mutual Benefit Health & Accident Assn. vs. 
Baldridge (10th Circ.) 70 F. (2d) 236; Heflebower vs. 
Sand, 71 F. Supp. 607, syllabus points #1, 2, and 3, at 
pages 609 and 610; J uden vs. Southeast Missouri 
Tel. Co. (Mo.), 235 S.\V. (2d) 360, syllabus point 1, at 
page 363. The court's assertion in its majority opinion 
that no clearly and unequivocally expressed intention 
to indemnify Union Pacific against the consequences of 
its own negligence is to be found in the language of 
indemnity here presented because 
"it would have been easy enough to use that 
very language and to thus make that intent clear 
and unmistakable, which was not done here," 
is wholly inconsistent with the law of \Vyoming, shown 
by the Rissler decision, to the effect that no such specific 
use of the word "negligence" or its equivalent is neces-
sary in order to make such intent clear and unmistakable. 
In the absence of some explanation or even mention by 
this court as to why it has refused to follow the law of 
\Vyoming in this regard, we cannot but conclude the 
court overlooked this important matter. 
Lastly in this connection appellant desires to ask 
the court to reconsider the real validity of some of the 
remarks made near the top of page 3 of its opinion. 
The court said: 
'' each liarty is entitlt>d to assume that 
the other intends to conduct himself as a reason-
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able and prudent person ... , which presupposes 
that he will commit no wrongful act nor be guilty 
of negligence." 
Whatever the merits of such a doctrine in situations 
such as were involved in the cases cited by the court 
in its footnote #2, it is not a principle which has ab-
solutely universal application even in tort cases. Please 
see Lillie vs. Thompson, Trustee, 332 U.S. 459, 92 L.Ed. 
73, 68 Sup. Ct. 140; Restatement of Torts (2d), Sec. 
302 A, Comment ( c) ; Sec. 302 B, Comment ( e). And 
the view that two parties contracting for indemnity do 
so "presupposing" the indemnitee will "commit no 
wrongful act nor be guilty of negligence" is scarcely 
realistic. How can such an assumed "presupposition" 
be squared with the actual fact that in the case at bar 
the parties specifically provided for indemnity to Union 
Pacific for amounts paid for liability to third persons, 
not parties to the agreement, as to whom Union Pacific 
would not even be legally liable unless found to be 
negligent or at fault in some way' How can such a 
"presupposition" be squared with the hundreds of cases 
in which courts have found the parties did by contract 
provide for indemnity for losses due to an indemnitee's 
own negligence? How can such a "presupposition" be 
reconciled with the realities of liability insurance pur-
chased by almost everyone? Do insurance companies 
really sell, and automobile owners and others really buy, 
liability insurance "presupposing" the buyer will never 
be guilty of negligence? Is the frame of mind of those 
entering indemnity agreements so wholly different than 
those involved in the insurance analogy mentioned above 
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as to justify this court's reliance in a contract case on 
a very general tort principle which ha.s limited applica-
tion even in its own tort field f 
The court also said : 
. "A closely related proposition pertinent here 
is that the law does not look with favor upon one 
exacting a covenant to relieve himself of the basic 
duty which the law imposes on everyone: that of 
using due care for the safety of himself and 
others. This would tend to encourage careless-
ness and would not be salutary either for the per-
son seeking to protect himself or for those whose 
safety may be hazarded by his conduct." 
As to these statements by the court we suggest the fol-
lowing: (1) An indemnity agreement such as here in-
volved did not even purport to relieve appellant of the 
responsibility of exercising due care. More, it did not 
even purport to relieve appellant of a legal duty to 
respond in damages to Stacey. Its real effect, as is 
pointed out in Cozzi vs. Owens Corning Fiber Glass 
Corp. (N.J.) 164 A.(2d) 69, was to allocate as between 
Union Pacific and El Paso the responsibility for pro-
viding the resources, whether by contractual liability 
insurance or by other means, for paying losses both 
knew would inevitably someday occur. (2) The notion 
that indemnity contracts tend to encourage carelessness 
is also unrealistic. Is the fact that some justices of this 
court undoubtedly carry liability insurance as automo-
bile owners one which "tends to encourage carelessness" 
on their part 1 At least, is any such tendency of real 
legal moment for any purpose 1 And even if it is, of 
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what real importance is that tendency in a case such 
as this? The negligence relied upon by Stacey in his 
suit against Union Pacific was claimed and alleged to 
exist in the conduct of appellant's train service em-
ployes. Is it really to be supposed in common sense 
that those employes tended to be less careful than they 
otherwise would have been simply because an indemnity 
agreement, which none of them had ever even heard 
existed, may have afforded their employer indemnity 
relief against loss? Please see the remarks of Messrs. 
Harper and James, Vol. 2, The Law of Torts, page 771 
et seq., on the subject of the effect of liability insurance 
on the traditional "objective of tort law" to deter un-
reasonably dangerous conduct and to promote the taking 
of reasonable precautions. On this particular subject 
matter is there any real difference between liability 
insurance and an indemnity agreement? ( 3) Is it ap-
propriate today for courts to "look with disfavor" upon 
indemnity agreements covering the indemnitee's negli-
gence? If so, why? Is there anything antisocial or im-
moral in our courts allowing two corporations such as 
are parties here to decide between themselves at whose 
risk certain losses shall be borne irrespective of whose 
"negligence proximately caused" those losses T If there 
is something inherently antisocial about such an agree-
ment, what makes it so in the present climate of tort 
liability? In all good faith, we say to the court its 
remark that "the law does not look with favor" is un-
sound in principle and inconsistent with modern indem-
nity cases cited in our previous briefs. Please see the 
Cozzi case cited supra at page 16 hereof. 
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ARGUMENT POINT III 
In support of Point 5 of this Petition for Rehearing 
we point out this court relies upon Vinnell Company, Inc. 
vs. Pac. Elec. Ry. Co. (Calif.), 340 P.(2d) 604, in its foot-
note 4; and upon Southern Pacific Co. vs. Layman 
(Ore.), 145 P.(2d) 295, in its footnote 5, to support its 
decision. The Vinnell case is no longer followed slavish-
ly even in California. Please see Harvey Machine Co., 
Inc. vs. Hatzel & Buehler, Inc. (1960) (Calif.), 353 P.(2d) 
924, cited in appellant's "Reply Brief." The Layman 
case seems to us to afford an even more precarious 
foundation for decision in view of what the Oregon 
Supreme Court, who wrote it, later said about it and 
about indemnity agreements between large corporations 
in Southern Pacific Co. vs. Morrison-Knudsen Co., Inc. 
(Ore.), 338 P. ( 2d) 665, at 672 et seq. vVhatever disposi-
tion is finally made of the case at bar, we ask this court 
to reconsider whether or not it really wishes the law of 
this state pertaining to contracts for indemnity to be 
left, as the court's footnotes now indicate, in reliance 
upon decisions of other jurisdictions whose absolutism 
is rejected at least in part even by the courts of the 
authoring states; and also in a general condition wholly 
inconsistent with the current judicial thought on indem-
nity law. 
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CONCLUSION 
Counsel for appellant are fully aware this court 
does not favor unwarranted use of the court's rehearing 
procedure. We intend no disregard of the court's under-
standable desire to avoid needless decisions on petitions 
for rehearing; nor do we intend any offense or disrespect 
to this court by what is said in this brief. However, for 
the reasons pointed out herein, we strongly urge that 
this important case deserves reconsideration and re-
versal of the judgment below. We have neither the right 
nor the desire simply to quarrel with this court's opinion. 
But appellant's legal privilege to invite further thought 
by this court on the issues presented in this lawsuit is 
hereby invoked. 
Respectfully submitted, 
BRYAN P. LEVERICH 
A. U. MINER 
HOWARD F. CORAY 
SCOTT M. MATHESON 
NORMAN W. KETTNER 
Counsel for Plaintiff-Appell.ant 
10 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
